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Tracking and Resisting 
Gains in Sexual 
BY SHEILA MCINTYRE WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CHRlSTlNE BOYLE, 
Cet article examine la vague de fond 
contre la re9rme des lois inspirke par 
1esfPministes. L 'auteure relie /'escalade 
de la violence faite a m  femmes et la 
prkencedirn courantdans la lpgishtion 
qui rksiste h f'egalitk, a m  rJactions 
qu 'elle a percues chez les femmes. 
Feminist efforts to expose, challenge, 
and eliminate direct, indirect, and 
systemic inequality in the substan- 
tive, evidentiary, and procedural laws 
proscribing sexual offences and in 
the enforcement and application of 
those laws have not only been con- 
sistently resisted by police, lawyers, 
judges, and juries, but have consist- 
ently generated backlash against those 
responsible for andlor supportive of 
such egalitarian change. Actual and 
imagined social, economic, political, 
and legal equality gains by women as 
a class-however unevenly distrib- 
uted-have triggered a variety of 
types of backlash, including an esca- 
lation in actual or threatened vio- 
lence against women accompanied 
by new equality-resistant strains of 
legal doctrine that effectively offset 
or bypass earlier reforms. 
Three decades of feminist- 
inspired law reforms 
The first major product of post- 
war feminist legal activism was the 
Report ofthe Royal Commission on the 
Status of Women. Published in 1970, 
the Reportdid not even identify male 
violence against women as a signifi- 
cant women's issue, let alone as a 
reflection and determinant of wom- 
en's subordinated social, political, 
economic, and legal status. Within 
the next decade, rape crisis centres 
and transition houses were being es- 
Many feminists 
hoped that 
elimination of 
sexist bias in 
the law and in 
its administration 
would deter 
violence primarily 
by reducing 
men's reasonable 
expectation of 
immunity. 
tablished by grassroots feminist ac- 
tivists across the country. O n  the 
basis ofthe questions front linework- 
ers asked of survivors of male sexual 
violence and the answers women 
gave, the myths and the webs of 
(hetero)sexist, racist, classist, and 
ablist stereotypes purporting to ex- 
plain or serving to rationalize male 
sexual violence were exposed and 
challenged (Lakeman). Ground- 
breaking feminist research docu- 
menting sexism in almost all legal 
doctrines and in law enforcement 
practices was beginning to burgeon 
(Clark and Lewis; Backhouse and 
Cohen; MacLeod; Pickard; Boyle 
198 1). Increasing numbers ofwomen 
enrolled in universities, including in 
law schools; some were radicalized, 
not least by studying the obvious 
sexism embedded in sexual offence 
laws. In this socio-political context, 
women protested and helped reduce 
sexually objectifying treatment of 
women in the media; the anti-por- 
nography movement was born; 
women students, women unionists 
and women lawyers called for,, and 
gradually secured, prohibitions on, 
and remedies for, sexual harassment; 
and the first alarms indicating the 
pervasiveness of child sexual abuse 
were sounded. 
Feminist efforts to reform crimi- 
nal law have represented only one 
branch ofthis multi-faceted andlong- 
term anti-violence agenda. Many 
feminists hoped that elimination of 
sexist bias in the law and in its ad- 
ministration would deter violence 
primarily by reducing men's reason- 
able expectation of immunity from 
sanction and women's reasonable 
expectations of unjust treatment and 
unjust outcomes upon reporting. 
Effective criminal laws effectively 
enforced were then and still are con- 
sidered a necessary incident and in- 
dicator of state, and ultimately 
societal, recognition of women's full 
personhood and right to security of 
the person and to sexual autonomy. 
As at the end of 1999, the socio- 
political context in which criminal 
law operates is one in which the 
sexual inequality which facilitates, 
institutionalizes, and rationalizes 
male sexual violence is worsening' 
exponentially. An intensifying ex- 
ploitation of women, women's pro- 
ductive and reproductive labour, 
women's bodies and women's body 
parts are currently thestate-supported 
private order. Simultaneously, the 
dismantling ofequality-enabling or - 
advancing public benefits, services, 
and institutions is the global market- 
dictated public order. In this con- 
text, the full humanity, citizenship 
and fundamental right to self-deter- 
mination ofeven the most privileged 
of women remains far from estab- 
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lished. In this oppressive context, 
small wonder that so many indi- 
vidual men do not recognize or re- 
spect the personhood and the per- 
sonal as well as sexual autonomy of 
women as a class, especially the au- 
tonomy of the most systemically dis- 
possessed of women-Aboriginal 
women, women of colour, poor 
women, womenwith disabilities, les- 
bians, immigrant and  refugee 
women. Small wonder, too, that so 
many (primarily, but not only, male) 
defence counsel equate the constitu- 
tional right to a fair trial with an 
accused rapist's right to violate wom- 
en's constitutional rights to security 
of the person, privacy and equality. 
And small wonder courts continue 
to acquit men who would rather 
make the mistake of raping a non- 
consentingwoman than take reason- 
able steps to determine and abide by 
her sexual will. 
Where we began 
In 1970, a number of beliefs, as- 
sumptions, and presumptions were 
formally or informally encoded in 
sexual offence law, police charging, 
and prosecutorial screening practices, 
accredited in legal education, de- 
ployed by defence counsel in plea 
bargaining and at trial, invoked 
openly by judges in their evidentiary 
rulings and their reasons or jury in- 
structions and at play in jury delib- 
erations. 
*A (good) woman cannot be raped 
against herwill, andwill mount fierce 
resistance before yielding her virtue. 
She should have injuries to corrobo- 
rate her claims ofhaving been forced. 
*A (good) wife cannot be raped at 
all, because she does or should will- 
So many 
defence counsel 
equate the 
constitutional right 
to  a fair trial 
with an accused 
rapist's right to  
violate women's 
constitutional rights 
to  security of the 
person. privacy, 
and equality. 
ingly yield her body to her husband 
on demand or because she is matri- 
monial property or because she will- 
ingly chose the marital contract's 
exchange of sexual services for eco- 
nomic support. 
*A bad woman is defacto rapeable 
because a'e jure unworthy of rape 
law's protection: she has no reputa- 
tion or virtue to lose and no value as 
marriageable property; she is a tempt- 
ress, a tease, a homebreaker. Bad 
womanhood is associated with the 
"inferior" races, with mental "defec- 
tiveness," withsexual inversion,with 
poverty. White, educated, mentally 
sound, heterosexual, middle class 
women possess a "natural" modesty. 
*A (normal) woman will raise an 
immediate hue and cry after her rape; 
she will report her violation at the 
first reasonable opportunity and her 
distress, shame or terror will be plain 
to see. 
*An unchastewoman is more likely 
to consent to sex with any and every 
man and to lie about it. Unchaste 
women, being sexually indiscrimi- 
nate, may be presumed to be con- 
senting no matter their efforts to 
contradict that presumption. 
*Reports ofsexual abuse by women 
and children are inherently suspect: 
easily made and hard to dispel. They 
are uniquely inclined to lie about 
rape and sexual abuse so should not 
be believed absent independent cor- 
roboration. Their character and psy- 
chiatric makeup must be scrutinized 
for motives to fabricate rape charges 
or for signs of rape fantasies or delu- 
sions. They are uniquely suggestible, 
easy prey to  disturbed or man-hating 
therapists. 
*Absent overt resistance that is 
recognized as such by a sexual aggres- 
sor and by the trier offact, silence can 
be taken as a yes; no may mean yes; 
drinking or dancing with, humour- 
ing, accepting a ride or working late 
with, faking sleep, rolling over in 
one's sleep, wearing particular clothes 
or few clothes or sex-appropriate 
clothes, being unescorted by a man- 
all may mean yes if a man who wants 
sex wants it to mean yes or can per- 
suade a judge or jury that there is 
some air of reality to the logic by 
which his wish becomes her desire. 
It is a testimony to the political 
effectiveness of the last 30 years of 
feminist activism that most women 
and many men-including criminal 
law professors, defence and Crown 
counsel, Justice Department lawyers, 
and judges-consciously acknowl- 
edge the above statements to be based 
on discriminatory stereotypes that 
are unfounded in fact, yet mythic in 
their tenacious hold upon the Anglo- 
American legal imagination. Most 
feminists and some men both in and 
outside of law also understand that 
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these "myths" help men individually daughters choose to name and sue the inequalities of power involved, 
and as a class to rationalize their 
sexual abuses or to distinguish their 
own "natural" sexual aggression or 
ordinary sexual opportunism from 
the really culpable and injurious kind 
practised by those aberrant, truly 
violent, genuinely scary ,men the 
criminal law is meant to isolate and 
jail. Finally, many feminists andsome 
men also recognize that these "myths" 
help shore up racist, heterosexist, 
ablist, and classist stereotypes about 
the sexual mores and practices said to 
distinguish members of dominant 
groups of both sexes from women 
and men who are members of subor- 
dinated groups. 
In face ofso much continuing vio- 
lence against women and children 
and in face of the laissez-faireposture 
ofthe state towards the violence and 
towards the systemically unequal 
conditions which generate, rational- 
ize and perpetuate it, it is easy to 
discount some of the positive im- 
pacts of the public education and 
consciousness-raising effected by 
three decades of feminist struggle. 
The public is less likely to attribute 
an acquittal to the mythic lying or 
spiteful or delusional complainant, 
and more likely to conclude that the 
law simply doesn't work for rape 
victims. Women are more likely to 
claim the right to physical integrity, 
more likely to conceive of any and all 
sexual invasions whether committed 
by a date or a stranger, with or with- 
out penetration, as criminal. Women 
are prepared to charge more power- 
ful and more high-ranking men; more 
likely to register and seek sanction 
against the double injury of sexual 
abuse enabled by abuse oftrust, power 
or authority. Even knowing the de- 
gree to which the system does not 
work for any women and will likely 
not work for them, Aboriginal 
women choose to (attempt to) bring 
their teacher-priest-employer-Bishop 
to account (OJConnor); psychiatric 
patients and drug addicts choose to 
(attempt to) bring their doctors 
(Norberg v. Wynrib) and psychia- 
trists ( M. (A.) V. Ryan)to account; 
and prosecute their rapist fathers (M. 
(K) v. M. (H.)) and step-fathers (R. 
v. M. (M. L.)); working class women 
(Robichaud; Janzen) choose to name 
their employers. Some win; none 
without years of litigation and inde- 
fensible violation at the hands of the 
legal system. 
The public is less 
likely to attribute 
an acquittal to 
the mythic lying 
or spiteful or 
delusional 
complainant, and 
more likely to 
conclude that 
the law simply 
doesn't work for 
rape victims. 
The legal system itself has proved 
less responsive to three decades of 
feminist struggle. Unfortunately, it 
is testimony to the power of the 
powerful to name the world from 
their own point of view and in their 
own interest, that feminist efforts to 
decode the discriminatory logic and . - 
results of these rape myths and 
rationalizations, and to expunge them 
from criminal law and its application 
have, for the most part, failed. 
Whether based on principles of for- 
mal or substantive equality, the ma- 
jor feminist-inspired statutory re- 
formsof 1983,1992, and 1997 have, 
at best, eliminated the formal expres- 
sion of rape myths and rational- 
ization~, not their informal opera- 
tion and substantively discrimina- 
tory impact on the enforcement of 
sexual assault law. At worst, the sub- 
stantive equality ~rinciples and con- 
stitutional equality entitlements un- 
derpinning these reforms have been 
outright ignored, or merely dis- 
counted by every level ofcourt. Given 
rendering feminist reforms empty 
requires little more than concerted 
resistance from the dominant-in 
this context, individual male sexual 
abusers, defence and Crown coun- 
sel, criminal scholars, legislative draft- 
ers and judges. The caselaw is replete 
with evidence of such concerted re- 
sistance. Resistance has escalated to 
backlash whenever feminists have 
scored a political victory despite be- 
ing out-numbered, out-ranked and 
out-resourced. These moments, per- 
haps, suggest there may be some 
Achilles' heels in the fabric of raced, 
classed, ablist and heterosexualized 
male supremacy. 
Resistance to 1983 reforms 
Virtually the entire package of 
sexual offence reforms codified in 
1983 was premised on formal equal- 
ity principles. The aspiration of the 
reforms was to rename and rewrite 
sexual offence law so that its enforc- 
ers would treat criminal injury of 
women-all women-in the same 
way and with the same seriousness as 
they treat criminal injuries to men, 
and according to the same charging 
practices, the same rules of evidence 
and the same jury instructions. The 
reforms collapsed the gender specific 
crimes of "rape," "indecent assault 
on a male" and "indecent assault on 
a female" under the gender neutral 
label "sexual assault"; eliminated the 
marital rape exemption; completely 
or significantly abrogated rules of 
evidence (recent complaint, corrobo- 
ration and sexual history rules) that 
treated testimony by sexual offence 
complainants more suspiciously than 
that of other crime victims and that 
treated "good girls" differently from 
"bad girls" (the rule allowing admis- 
sion of "evidence" of general sexual 
reputation). Proponents of the re- 
forms hoped that by de-sexing the 
law's language and reclassifying it as 
a crime of violence, not an offence 
against public morals and not a mat- 
ter of uncontrolled lust, the sexual 
double standards embedded in the 
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law would disappear. There was not 
a little liberal idealism in this project: 
if reformers could just find the right 
words to displace entrenched mis- 
conceptions, dispel ignorance, ex- 
pose irrational stereotypes, and ap- 
peal to liberal rationalism and fair- 
ness, bias in the legal system would 
be gradually exposed and repudi- 
ated. Such idealism proved mis- 
placed. Even at the time, many femi- 
nists opposed this strategy (see Cohen 
and Backhouse; Heald; o ; Osborne). 
Although sexual assault reporting 
rates significantly increased follow- 
ing the 1983 reforms, police found- 
ing and charging rates have remained 
unchanged (Roberts and Grossman; 
Clark and Hepworth) and charging 
practices minimize the injury done 
thereby enabling plea bargains or 
sentences which further diminish the 
gravity ofthe crime.' Virtually all the 
evidentiary rules that were formally 
abrogated in 1983 (and that survived 
the Seaboyer decision), continue to 
operate informally in police and 
prosecutorial screening practices, at 
trial and, in the event ofa conviction, 
in sentencing. In particular, evidence 
deemed corroborative (physical and/ 
or genital injuries, a display of dis- 
tress upon first reporting an assault, 
immediate complaint) significantly 
enhances the likelihood of a case 
being prosecuted and resulting in 
conviction; evidence of unchastity 
or of substance use or abuse prior to 
an assault or inconsistencies in the 
details reported significantly increase 
unfounding, non-prosecution and 
acquittal rates. These findings have 
been confirmed in cases of child 
sexual abuse, (Gunn and Linden) 
sexual assaults of adult women 
(Feldberg), and proceedings brought 
by adult survivors of child sexual 
abuse (Kelly et al.). 
The 1983 reforms had outright 
prohibited the introduction of evi- 
dence ofwomen's sexual history with 
anyone other than the accused ex- 
cept in four narrow circumstances. 
This near-blanket exemption (S. 
276) was struck down by a majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the 1991 Seaboyer decision on the 
ground that in "rare" cases the ex- 
emption would deprive the defence 
of relevant evidence whose proba- 
tive value outweighed its prejudicial 
effects. The consolation prize offered 
by the majority was their holding 
that sexual history evidence could 
no longer be admitted for the "irra- 
Evidence of 
unchastity or 
of substance use 
or abuse prior 
to an assault or 
inconsistencies in 
the details reported 
significantly 
increase 
unfounding, non- 
prosecution and 
acquittal rates. 
tional" and "illegitimate" purpose 
of invoking the "twin myths" that a 
sexually active woman is more likely 
to have consented to or to lie about 
the sexual activity subject to pros- 
ecution. Unfortunately, in illustrat- 
ing types of sexual history evidence 
that S. 276 had unconstitutionally 
excluded, the majority offered ex- 
amples of what they considered 
"similar pattern" evidence or evi- 
dence of "motive to fabricate" which 
rely on twin myth logic or invite 
twin myth inferences. Examples such 
as the case of a prostitute in the 
habit of extorting extra payment 
from men by threatening to report 
them for rape or the case of a young 
girl who spitefully claims that her 
father sexually assaulted her to re- 
taliate for his termination of her 
incestuous relationship with her 
brother [!l offer defence counsel 
ample opportunity to undermine the 
credibiliry of a woman or child com- 
plainant by equating non-virginity 
with dishonesty. 
Resistance to 1992 reforms 
The Seaboyer decision, of course, 
spawned the second major overhaul 
of sexual offence law in a decade. 
Among other things, the 1992 re- 
forms expressly codified the majori- 
ty's prohibition on admission of 
sexual history evidence to support 
twin myth inferences. In addition, it 
codified detailed guidelines enumer- 
ating eight factors judges must con- 
sider before admitting sexual history 
evidence judicially determined not 
to depend on twin myth logic. A 
1997 review of the impacts of the 
reforms shows that judges are fol- 
lowing the guidelines in form only, 
not in substance. In numerous cases, 
judges simply recite the eight factors 
in S. 276(3) without anysort ofanaly- 
sis before admitting sexual history 
evidence. Where judges purport to 
apply, rather than merely recite, the 
guidelines, some 25-50 per cent of 
sexual history evidence sought to be 
admitted goes in. As well, judges 
frequently disregard the requirement 
that defence counsel provide "de- 
tailed particulars" of the nature and 
the relevance of the evidence sought 
to be adduced. Instead, vague asser- 
tions of relevance by defence counsel 
are found to satisfy S. 276.1 (2) 
(Meredith et aL). 
The internal contradictions in the 
reasoning of the Seaboyer majority 
have provided ample room for de- 
fence lawyers to use twin myth logic 
while purporting to foreswear it. Not 
surprisingly, defence counsel have 
been successful in applications to 
admit sexual history evidence to sup- 
port an alleged motive to fabricate. 
Particularly disturbing have been 
counsels' successes in securing ad- 
mission of evidence of childhood 
sexual abuse or previous sexual as- 
saults to discredit those reporting 
sexual violence by a later perpetrator. 
Some defence lawyers have success- 
fully argued prior non-consensual sex 
is not even covered by S. 276,' on the 
basis that the evidence is "relevant" 
because past assaults raise thespectre 
of bias and prejudice against men as 
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a motive to fabricate. Others have 
argued that past abuse may affect the 
reliability of a woman's (or child's) 
evidence: they may be mistaken or 
deluded about the identity of the 
true perpetrator or so damaged that 
their perceptions are unreliable. 
Defence counsel have also been 
successful in arguing that they seek 
to use a woman's sexual history not 
to support a general inference that 
she is more likely to have consented 
to sex with the accused andlor to lie 
about that sex, but to support a more 
spec$c inference. Thus, sexual his- 
tory evidence has been admitted into 
trial to rebut an unstated inference 
that a schoolgirl would never have 
consented to group sex in a school 
yard (where "consent" was the de- 
fence to the schoolyard gang rape of 
a young girl with mental disabili- 
ties); or to rebut an unstated infer- 
ence that achildwould neither know 
nor be capable of making up the 
particulars of the prosecuted sexual 
contact (where the child's previous 
sexual abuse is used to support the 
defence of mistaken identity or mis- 
taken incident). If such "specific" 
inferences are accepted as untainted 
by twin myth logic, the only prohib- 
ited use of sexual history evidence 
will be where "defence counsel ex- 
plicitly state that the only use of the 
evidence [is] to promote the myths 
and stereotypes by the jury" (Me- 
redith et al. 14). 
Defence lawyers have achieved 
their most spectacular evasion of S. 
276 with their expansive pursuit of 
pre-trial disclosure of complainants' 
personal records. Substantively, this 
tactic secures everything prohibited 
by Seaboyer and Bill C-49 by formal- 
ist means. By attaching a different 
generic label (personal record not 
sexualhistory), the defence can pur- 
sue the same discrediting andlor in- 
timidating effects, invoke twin myth 
reasoning, and even secure sexual 
strates, the reasons-if any-ad- 
vanced for seeking pre-trial disclo- 
sure include testing for evidence of 
recent complaint, testing "credibil- 
ity at large," looking for prior incon- 
sistent statements and searching for 
motives to fabricate. 
Although Bill C-49 was a direct 
response to the Seaboyer decision, its 
An accused who 
thinks that "No" 
means "Yes" has 
made a mistake of 
law. Evidence of 
past sexual history 
advanced to 
argue that "No" 
meant something 
else is simply 
immaterial. 
attempted correctives went far be- 
yond the codification of guidelines 
for the admission of sexual history 
e~idence .~  The feminist strategy un- 
derlying the Bill was to amend the 
substantive law of sexual assault to 
define consent and non-consent so 
as to narrow the range of "evidence" 
legally capable of being "relevant" to 
the determination of innocence or 
guilt, and then to require judges to 
subject that narrowed residual pool 
of relevancy determinations to a 
broader range of constitutional con- 
siderations than had been applied by 
the Seaboyer majority. In Seaboyer, 
women's constitutional right under 
S. 15 of the Charter to formally and 
substantively equal treatment under 
criminal law were explicitly disre- 
garded by the ma j~r i ty .~  Both the 
Preamble and the text of Bill C-49 
or to subordinate women's constitu- 
tional equalit, rights to accused men's 
fair trial rights. 
The Bill defines consent for the 
first time, and in a way that recog- 
nizes women as sexual  agent^,^ not as 
any man's sexual property, far less as 
a male sexual projection. Defined as 
"voluntary agreement," consent is 
something a woman dues, andfieely 
chooses to do, not something men 
fantasize or choose for her, far less 
unilaterally force on her. This ap- 
proach should have eliminated any 
remaining vestige of the "resistance" 
standard of non-consent. Coupled 
with codification of a non-exhaus- 
tive list of circumstances in which 
law will deem no consent to exist, S. 
273.1 was also intended to convert 
self-serving rape myths and 
rationalizations proffered as honest, 
but mistaken, beliefs in a woman's 
consent, into errors of law. Given S. 
273.1 (2) (d), for example, an accused 
who thinks that "No" means "Yes" 
has made a mistake of law, not of 
fact. More, as a matter of law, evi- 
dence ofpast sexual history advanced 
to ground an argument that "No" 
meant something else is simply im- 
material. The Bill also prohibits re- 
sort to the mistake defence by any 
accused who did not take "reason- 
able steps" to ascertain whether a 
sexual partner ever consented to 
sexual activity. 
To  date, Bill C-49 has survived 
constitutional challenge to its most 
innovative provisions (Darrochv. The 
Queen). However, the Supreme 
Court has yet to pronounce on Par- 
liament's rejection ofseaboyer. What- 
ever the Court decides, as noted 
above, sexual and other personal his- 
tory evidence is flooding in at trial, 
contrary to the intent and the letter 
ofthe law. Meanwhile, the impact of 
the reforms is largely a matter of 
judicial interpretation of the new 
consentlnon-consent and mistake 
history information embedded in were designed to try to prevent the provisions. Here, the record is am- 
other records without satisfying ei- judgeswho applied the new law and/ biguous. 
ther S. 276(3) or the general thresh- or who adjudicated constitutional The good news is that the Su- 
old for the admissibility of evidence. challenges mounted against it from preme Court appears to have re- 
As Karen Busby's research demon- continuing to outright ignore S. 15 jected theresistancestandardofcon- 
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sent, at least, in principle. The Court any such defence amounts to a mis- accused must have believed that the 
has clearly held that a failure to vig- take about the legal meaning ofcon- complainant positively communi- 
orously resist unwantedsexual touch- sent. Even without reference to the cated consent to the sexual activity in 
ing is not required to prove that the 
sex in question was non-consensual. 
Where a teenage !girl pretended to  be 
asleep when abused by her stepfa- 
ther: andwhere another teenage girl 
clearly said "No" each of the three 
times a much older man touched her 
sexually (R. v. Ewanchuk), the Court 
has rejected defence arguments (and 
appellate court rulings) that consent 
was "implied and101 that non-con- 
sent was not proved beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt. 
The bad news is that both of these 
complainants didresist, albeit not so 
fiercely that only the pornographic 
imagination could deem them con- 
senting. Nonetheless, both judg- 
ments would appear to  establish 
that-at least with conscious com- 
plainants-an absence of affirma- 
tively communicated consent estab- 
lishes non-consent in law. Put differ- 
ently, the Court has rejected defence 
efforts to (continue to) treat consent 
as the default position, that is to 
presume consent exists until non- 
consent is demonstrated, and dem- 
onstrated in a way persuasive to a 
sexual aggressor andlor to the trier of 
fact. The substantive importance of 
so elemental a legal acknowledge- 
ment of women's personhood en- 
tirely depends on whether courts 
acquit accused men who (claim to) 
honestly believe silence, utter passiv- 
ity, fearful acquiescence or explicit 
verbal rebuffs communicate consent.' 
Both individual complainants and 
women as a class understand that 
their rights to autonomy and secu- 
rity of the person are empty when a 
court accepts they were non-con- 
senting but acquits their rapist on 
the basis that a doubt exists about 
whether he honestly believed forced 
sex to be consensual. 
Although longstandingrape myths 
and rationalizations may well lend 
an "air of reality" to an accused's 
asserted or implied belief in his enti- 
tlement to engage in sexual activity 
until decisively stopped, since 1992, 
post-1992 constraints on access to 
the mistake defence, an honest mis- 
take of law may not  acquit 
(Vandervort). The 1992 amendment 
foreclosing access to the mistake de- 
fence to an accused who fails to take 
The Court has 
rejected defence 
efforts to treat 
consent as the 
default position, 
to presume 
consent exists until 
non-consent is 
demonstrated in a 
way persuasive to 
a sexual aggressor. 
reasonable steps to ascertain consent 
prior to extracting non-consensual 
sex, codifies this legal principle. There 
remains no clear consensus within 
the legal community and no clear 
dicta from the Supreme Court of 
Canada about whether the reason- 
able steps requirement modifies the 
mens rea, the actus reus or is, some- 
how, free-floating and leaves the mens 
rea unaffected. 
What is clear is that lower courts 
have taken an extremely lax approach 
to the mistake defence in circum- 
stances where the complainant was 
drunk, asleep, had voluntarily con- 
sumed drugs or was involuntarily 
drugged by her assailant.' 
Whether the Supreme Court's lat- 
est decision on sexual assault over- 
rules these unconscious complain- 
ant  decisions is not  clear. In 
Ewanchuk, the Court unanimously 
affirmed that there is no defence of 
" . ~mplied consent" to sexual assault 
in Canadian law; that in order to rely 
on the defence of honest mistake, an 
question; that some mistakes such as 
the self-serving view that silence 
means consent amount to culpable 
mistakes of law not exculpatory mis- 
takes of fact; and that continuing 
with sexual contact after someone 
hassaid no is, at aminimum, reckless 
conduct which is not excusable. O n  
the facts of the case, the Court held 
there was no air of reality to the 
accused's claim that he honestly be- 
lieved the complainant consented 
despite her havingsaid no each ofthe 
three times he touched her sexually. 
Several sections of the Ewanchuk 
judgment undercut these apparently 
positive holdings. Having held that 
mistakes as to "no" meaning "yes" 
are mistakes of law, the judgment 
would seem unnecessarily to have 
considered whether there was an air 
of reality to Ewanchuk's honest mis- 
take claim. More, the opinion largely 
ignores the "reasonable steps" limi- 
tation on the availability of the mis- 
take of fact defence, even had honest 
mistake been available to Ewanchuk. 
Because Ewanchuk took no steps to 
ascertain consent before sexually 
touching the complainant, the mis- 
take defence should not have been 
available to him. In short, the Court 
has confused rather than clarified the 
relation of the new mistake provi- 
sion to mens rta. Equally as confus- 
ing, the Court raised the hypotheti- 
cal spectre of "ambiguous conduct" 
on the part of a complainant as going 
to her credibility about consent. This 
leaves open the possibility that a trial 
judge may accept as a legal principle 
that consent may not be implied and 
accept that a complainant did not 
positively communicate consent, 
while acquitting on the basis of 
doubts about the honesty of a com- 
plainant's claim that the sex was un- 
wanted. 
Some reckoning(s) with 
resistance 
Viewed in their best light, the last 
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30 years of struggle against direct, 
indirect and systemic bias in the op- 
eration ofcriminal sexual assault laws 
do appear to have eliminated formal 
codification ofwomen's second class 
status. This struggle also appears to 
have reduced crude invocations by 
defence counsel and judges of preju- 
dices against all women or against 
those women whose racial, economic, 
or social inequality renders them most 
vulnerable to the predations of more 
leveraged men. However, it must 
also be conceded that, at least within 
the four corners of criminal law, re- 
sistance to egalitarian change, in- 
deed, resistance to the idea that con- 
stitutional equality rights have any 
bearing on the meaning ofa fair trial, 
has been massive and relentless. 
This disheartening history plainly 
affirms what feminists have known 
for some time in other contexts, but 
seem reluctant to concede on the 
subject of sexual violence: applica- 
tion of formal equality norms does 
not yield substantive egalitarian 
change. Mostly it yields rhetorical 
change not always for the better; or it 
yields technical evasions or new 
mechanisms to achieve the same sub- 
stantive ends by different means. 
Gender neutral language and rules 
only obscure gender specific prob- 
lems and, particularly the linkages 
between sexualizedviolence, systemic 
social inequality and the systemically 
unequal treatment of rape survivors 
in and by law. De-sexing legal lan- 
guage and rules does not de-sex the 
context in which sexual violence oc- 
curs, is (infrequently) reported and is 
legally processed; nor does it de-sex 
the "common sense" or subjective 
premises underlying relevancy 
determinations. Finally, the 
(hetero)sexist, racist, ablist andclassist 
biases and stereotypes about 
"women" as a class or about particu- 
lar constituencies ofwomen that dis- 
tort the fact finding process are not 
"irrational" biases curable with a lit- 
tle education once exposed to light. 
They are the predictable outcomes 
ofsystemically institutionalized rela- 
tions of domination which rational- 
ize expropriations in a variety of 
forms, including sexual. 
It is not plain that reforms driven 
by substantive equality principles are 
faring much better when Bill C-49 
can be sidestepped by pre-trial dis- 
closure requests wrapped in the same 
old stereotypes about women's sexu- 
ality or complainants' suspect dispo- 
Gender neutral 
rules obscure 
linkages between 
sexualized 
violence, systemic 
social inequality 
and the 
systemically 
unequal treatment 
of rape survivors 
in and by law. 
sitions, when sleeping women can 
still be found to have "voluntarily 
agreedn to sex, and courts have diffi- - 
culty distinguishing errors oflaw from 
mistakes of fact. The difficult, if cru- 
cial, question is whether criminal 
law and (non-feminist) criminal law 
scholars and practitioners are dis- 
tinctively resistant to change, or 
whether they simply reflect the in- 
tractability of rape myths and 
rationdizations in society at large. 
Reckoning with criminal law 
One possibility is that criminal 
law's norms are fundamentally in- 
consistent with substantive equality 
principles and impervious to sub- 
stantive understandings. Criminal 
law focuses on the individual and, 
for the most part, measures fault by 
subjective measures. Regardless of 
the sheer pervasiveness ofmale sexual 
violence, its high prevalence wher- 
ever those who enjoy institutional- 
ized power have ready access to the 
systemically disempowered, and the 
high volume of predation repotted 
by those sexual offenders who are 
convicted, criminal law's fundamen- 
tal starting point is to presume the 
innocence ofeach individual accused. 
Unless the state proves beyond a 
shadow of a doubt that the indi- 
vidual accused knowingly or reck- 
lessly violated the sexual integrity of 
another, the presumption of inno- 
cence will not be displaced. In so 
quintessential a contest ofcredibility 
as a rape prosecution, it dictates a less 
openly acknowledged corollary: the 
presumption that the accuser is sus- 
pect-mistaken about identity, un- 
reliable of memory, deluded or psy- 
chically brainwashed as to key events, 
wilfully lying or simply inherently 
shady of character and sexual dispo- 
sition. Male supremacist, racist, 
heterosexist and classist ideologies 
about all women's or some "types" of . - 
women's mental (in)capacities and 
sexual proclivities dovetail neatlywith 
these acknowledged and unacknowl- 
edged presumptions. 
By contrast, much of the thrust of 
feminist activism and analysis ofmale 
sexual violence has been to de-priva- 
tize and de-individuate its genesis, its 
harms, its social causes and its social 
beneficiaries. Feminist analyses link- 
ing male violence, systemic inequal- 
ity and biased codification and ap- 
plications of law, therefore, render 
problematic the presumption of in- 
dividual (male) innocence of sexual 
exploitation. While each sexual 
abuser may imagine he is operating 
alone, his power to abuse as well as its 
abuse are part of the social order 
keeping all women in our structur- 
ally debased place. No man on his 
own, without the overt or implicit 
collusion ofothers andwithout ideo- 
logical and institutional backing gets 
into a position to successfully attack 
women and get away with it. The 
individual rapist, batterer or woman- 
killer is supported by the hierarchies 
that allow him the extra power and 
status to exercise abusive or exploit- 
ive control over his unequals and to 
enforce his desires, by the same hier- 
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archies that keep her vulnerable to 
attack because she is economically, 
politically and legally disempowered 
and socially devalued; by the social 
policy agenda that refuses to censure 
or restrain him but that responds to 
her with psychiatry or social work; 
by the policies and ideologies that 
treat her as damaged goods or as a 
temporarily injured accident victim 
who, with professional treatment, 
can go back to normal; by a social 
order where "normalcy" consists of 
women's permanently unequal ac- 
cess to safety, money, power, status, 
political voice, credibility, the ben- 
efit and protection of most laws, in 
short to resources of all kinds to 
enable self-determination. Just as no 
man acts alone, no man, however 
non-violent, fails to benefit from the 
structural inequalities that facilitate 
rape, shore up men's freedoms, erode 
women's autonomy, inflate men's 
assumptions of entitlement, devalue 
women's humanity and discredit her 
word, and then codify male sexual 
presumptions as law's view of con- 
sent and of innocent errors. 
It may be that the individuated 
norms definitional to criminal law 
may yet be reconciled with the col- 
lectivized realities of systemic privi- 
lege and systemic dispossession that 
animate contemporary equality 
norms. This possibility is just highly 
improbable under conditions of 
worsening inequality. It may be, in 
other words, that we should consider 
pronouncing criminal law incorrigi- 
ble under present conditions, and 
their counsel should resort to it, if at 
all, only under protest and for politi- 
cal ends that are realizable with or 
without securing a conviction. 
Reckoning with criminal lawyers 
Recognizing the possible incom- 
patibility of criminal law norms and 
substantive egalitarian norms should 
not be confused with the claim that 
the criminal law exists distinct and 
apart from society or must operate 
from distinctive norms or that its 
be exempt from, say, the equality 
imperatives ofhuman rights and con- 
stitutional law. Women's three dec- 
ade struggle to expose, account for 
and end male sexual violence against 
women and children has always been 
a palpably lop-sided power struggle. 
One of the weapons stacked against 
egalitarian change has been the crimi- 
No man on his 
own, without the 
overt or implicit 
collusion of others 
and without 
ideological and 
institutional 
backing gets into a 
position to 
successfully attack 
women and get 
away with it. 
nal defence bar. Its leadership has 
predictably denounced every reform 
secured by feminist activism, but has 
been silent in face of peers who advo- 
cate or use intimidation tactics against 
complainants. Its practice, with far 
too few exceptions, has been to per- 
sist in knowingly trading on dis- 
criminatory logic and norms and to 
operate from the resistance standard 
of rules compliance-that is to vio- 
late, e.g. S. 276(1) and (2) or S. 278.2 
and 278.3 of the Criminal Code un- 
less forcefully resisted and stopped. 
Feminists need to think about ex- 
panding our legal activism to this 
heretofore untouchable front.  
Plainly, we need to contest the con- 
flation of an accused's right to a 
vigorous defence with the right to a 
wilfully discriminatory andlor rule- 
flouting defence. W e  need to caucus 
over several options. We might file 
multiple complaints with provincial 
law societies against both the most 
egregious practitioners and the most 
tics, minimally, to challenge the pro- 
fession's laissez faire approach to the 
boundaries of ethical criminal prac- 
tice and to force an articulation of 
what practices, if any, warrant pro- 
fessional censure. We might lobby 
for revision of the rules of profes- 
sional conduct to require compli- 
ance with the equality guarantees of 
the Charter. We might undertake to 
publicly name and censure individual 
defence lawyers we believe to be prac- 
tising unethically andlor to be flout- 
ing public law. 
Reckoning with judicial bias 
Periodically, the expression in 
sexual assault proceedings of overt 
judicial gender andlor race bias 
against complainants triggers com- 
plaints to judicial councils, typically 
by members of the public. The less 
overt but rather more routine opera- 
tion of biased reasoning in judicial 
handling of records disclosure or 
sexual history applications, in failing 
to check abusive defence conduct 
toward complainant witnesses, or in 
jury instructions have been largely 
immune from open criticism or cor- 
rection. While the Crown may ap- 
peal the verdict of an apparently bi- 
ased judge, listing reasonable appre- 
hension of bias as a ground for vacat- 
ing an acquittal is an extreme rarity. 
In either event, a judicial or judicial 
council finding against the judge is 
almost unheard of. Each of former 
Justice Bertha Wilson, and current 
Justices McLachlin and L'Heureux 
Dub6 has been the subject of com- 
plaints to the Canadian Judicial 
Council by the anti-feminist organi- 
zation, REAL Women for comment- 
ing on gender bias in Canadian legal 
doctrine or in judging. The first Black 
woman judge in Nova Scotia, Judge 
Corinne Sparks, faced retaliation 
from Crown counsel when she 
adverted to anti-Black racism by 
white police in acquitting a black 
teenager of assaulting a white, male 
police officer. Not only did the 
Crown appeal on the basis of her - - 
practitioners or adjudicators should routinelydi~criminator~defence tac- advertence to systemic racism, it al- 
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leged actual race bias not just con- order to develop strategies to insu- The tablingofBill C-49 unleashed 
duct giving rise to a reasonable ap- 
prehension of bias. Three (white, 
male) Supreme Court judges held 
that Judge Spark's remarks did raise 
a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
four (white male) judges considered 
her comments close to the line but 
not biased in law; and only the two 
white, women judges considered the 
remarks not just unobjectionable, 
but reflective of "an entirely appro- 
priate recognition of the facts in evi- 
dence ... and of the context within 
which [the] case arose-a context 
known to Judge Sparks and to any 
well-informed member of the com- 
munity" (R. v. R.D.S.). 
When the Crown appealed the 
Ewanchuk decision to the Supreme 
Court, it did not argue that Justice 
McClung's sexist reasons gave rise to 
a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
Nor did any of the men on the Su- 
preme Court bench who had faulted 
Corinne Spark's judicial conduct say 
a word against McClung's explicit 
sexism. When Justice L'Heureux- 
Dubt did name and deplore his sex- 
ist stereotyping and the rape myths it 
invoked, McClung responded with 
a vicious personal attack to the ap- 
plause of well-known defence coun- 
sel, Eddie Greenspan. REAL Women 
filed a complaint with the Canadian 
Judicial Council against Justice 
L'Heureux-Dubt. The CJC dismissed 
it as unfounded. Numerous people 
complained to the Alberta Judicial 
Council, which ultimately exoner- 
ated M c C l ~ n g . ~  
It might be comforting to project 
that this evidence of double stand- 
ards in application of the reasonable 
person test of bias will diminish as 
gender and race sensitivity training 
late women and male legal outsiders a frenzy of social and legal 
from biased applications of bias doc- scaremongering by criminal defence 
trine, while holding elite male judges counsel. "We'll need breathalyzers 
to equality-respecting standards. and written contracts at our bed- 
sides," they warned the general pub- 
Reckoning with backlash lic. "This law ignores the presump- 
tion of innocence," they submitted 
Both at the public level and within to Department of Justice officials 
All equality seeking 
groups need to 
develop strategies 
to insulate women 
and male legal 
outsiders from 
biased applications 
of bias doctrine, 
while holding elite 
male judges to 
equality-respecting 
standards. 
the criminal defence bar, some femi- 
nist anti-violence initiatives have pro- 
voked responses beyond simple re- 
sistance; they have roused dispro- 
portionately explosive defensiveness 
and hostility. In 1989, on the cam- 
pus ofqueen's University, receipt of 
rape awareness literature in their resi- 
dences moved several men to post 
huge posters in their windows blar- 
ing, for instance, "No means, down 
on your knees bitch" and "No means 
more beer." At Queen's law school, 
this backlash was for male eyes only: 
"No means fuck me 'til I bleed" sat 
undisturbed on the men's washroom 
walls for two months until removed 
and the legislative committee review- 
ing the amendments. REAL women 
described Bill C-49 as the "Despise 
Men" amendment (Minutes of Pro- 
ceedings and Evidence of Legislative 
Committee on Bill C-49). Professor 
Rob Martin described it as woman- 
hating.'' Notwithstanding the sky- 
is-falling hyperboles of defence law- 
yers prior to its enactment, little re- 
ally changed on the ground. And, in 
any event, some defence counsel 
adopted a far more effective intimi- 
dation tactic "Whacking" the com- - 
plainant with so many or such inva- 
sive pre-trial disclosure requests that 
she drops charges." 
The aggressive pursuit of com- 
plainants' personal records appears 
to be a pointed retaliation for Bill C- 
49, even a show of legal force. The 
tactic may also have emerged be- 
cause men historically largely immu- 
nized from criminal charges for their 
criminal sexual conduct, have seen 
that  immuni ty  erode. Bishop 
O'Connorwas the priest, school prin- 
cipal and employer of the young 
Aboriginal women he raped and in- 
decently assaulted. Mr. Beharriell was 
charged with assaulting his daugh- 
ter's playmate at a time when he was 
a father substitute after the death of 
her father. Dr Ryan was a psychia- 
trist sued for sexually abusing a pa- 
tient. Mr. Carosella was a public 
school teacher reported by astudent. 
for judges takes effect. But some in the wake of the Montreal massa- Such men do not plea bargain: they 
judges are challenging such initia- cre. The massacre itself triggered pay defence counsel to reaffirm that 
tives as an incursion on judicial inde- enormous male rage against and the best defence is a good offence. 
pendence. Given the formalism of media disapproval of feminists' in- This offensive strategy operates on 
the law on judicial independence sistence on the linkages between three levels. Womenwho report their - 
(see Reference Re Renumeration of Ltpine's anti-feminism and mi- violation will now be forewarned by 
Judges of the Provincial Court) this sogyny and pandemic male violence police or Crown lawyers or by rape 
challenge should be taken seriously. against women. Every year, women- crisis counsellors or therapists that 
All equality seeking groups need to only "Take Back theNight" marches all of their personal records may be 
turn their minds to bias doctrine in trigger feminist bashing. subject to disclosure to the accused. 
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Women seeking counselling from 
rape crisis centres, women's centres, 
family physicians or therapists may 
be warned by those services that what 
they say could be subject to a disclo- 
sure order. Women attempting to 
provide counselling services may 
cease to take notes or risk profes- 
sional sanctions for not taking or for 
shredding their notes, or may under- - 
mine a patient's prosecution of her 
abuser by shredding their notes. In 
pursuit of all three goals, defence 
counsel, aided and abetted by a five 
judge majority ofthe Supreme Court 
of Canada, have gone after rape crisis 
centre records and the records of 
feminist therapists, with avengeance 
(see 0 'Connor and Carosella) . 
Both defence counsel and the Su- 
preme Court majority were finessed 
for a brief interval when Parliament 
effectively overruled O'Connor by 
enacting Bill C-46 in 1997. While it 
took five years before any constitu- 
tional challenge to Bill C-49 hit an 
appeal court; Bill C-46 was targeted 
across the country within weeks ofits 
passage andstruck down almost sum- 
marily within some ten weeks of its 
enactment ( R  v. Mills). Bill C-46 
contains no fewer than three refer- 
ences to the Charter's equality guar- 
antees. Nonetheless, the invalidat- 
ing court did not so much as advert 
to S. 15. In this respect, it emulated 
Supreme Cour t  majorities in 
Seaboyer, Daviault, O'Connor and 
Beharriell, and adjudicated the de- 
fendant's constitutional challenge as 
if the Constitution contained no S. 
15 (Boyle 1994). 
In a related development, efforts 
by adult survivors ofchildhood sexual 
abuse are being defended by means 
of an aggressive and co-ordinated 
attack on therapists said to be im- 
planting their clients with false 
memories of abuse. In an eerie twist 
on the mistake of fact defence, de- 
fendants (and some courts) argue 
that although the complainant hon- 
estly believes she was abused (and, 
hence, comes across as a credible 
witness), she is merely the suggest- 
ible pawn of an evil, man-hating, 
feminist therapist. Canadian defence 
counsel have enthusiastically em- 
braced the pseudo science and neo 
mythmaking of the False Memory 
Syndrome Foundation while turn- 
ing a blind eye to evidence of its flat 
out intimidation tactics and the 
number of charged and convicted 
abusers on its membership roster 
(Hoult; Salter). In O'Connor, a bare 
majority of the scc gave judicial no- 
tice to false memory "syndrome" 
dogma without having heard any 
evidence that stated, much less tested 
False Memroy Syndrome Founda- 
tion claims, that reviewed genuine 
research on the nature of memory 
and memory repression or that es- 
tablished a foundation for the view 
that therapists can, much less do, 
implant false memories in their cli- 
ents.'' 
Throughout the decade when such 
eruptions of backlash occurred, the 
state was not neutral. The Mulroney 
government boycotted the National 
Advisory Committee on the Status 
of Women (NAC) meetings, de- - 
funded women's groups, and cut the 
Court Challenges program while 
throwing millions ofdollars into use- 
less research and feel-good policies 
aimed at strengthening families and 
healing family dysfunctions under 
the gender neutral rubric ofthe Fam- 
ily Violence Initiative. They insisted 
that women did not own the issue of 
male violence against women. They 
conditioned public fundingforwom- 
en's services on partnerships with 
private corporations or on service 
delivery by credentialed profession- 
als rather than feminists. Having di- 
vorced wife abuse from sexual vio- 
lence by housing responses to each 
under different ministries, they then 
read women out of policies purport- 
ing to respond to "Crime," gender 
neutral. 
Instead of developing policies and 
programs to relieve women's social 
and material inequality as the most 
effective approach to ending male 
violence, successive conservative and 
liberal policy-makers opted for three 
gender neutral diversions: the 
scapegoating of young offenders 
(rather than, say, more vigorously 
prosecuting adult men who abuse 
relations of trust, power, authority 
or, merely, intimacy); the promise of 
"Law and Order" through greater 
funding for policing and corrections 
while gutting funds for welfare, un- 
employment insurance, education, 
health services, and defying equal 
pay law, de-unioninzing secure, well- 
paying women's jobs in the public 
sector, reneging on affordable day 
care, and so on; and the prioritizing 
of victim's rights in lieu of women's 
or children's equality rights. Al- 
though no government has provided 
funding for rape crisis centre and 
transition house staff from across the 
country to meet on an annual basis, 
other vehicles enabling women to 
caucus nationally are being starved 
or axed one by one. The latest casu- 
alty, the annual Justice department 
consultations on violence against 
women have been discontinued on 
the basis that they are no more than 
special interest lobbying rather than . - 
genuine consultations. 
Why particular feminists initia- 
tives are simply resisted while others 
trigger major backlashwarrants care- 
ful scrutiny. Out-numbered, out- 
ranked, and out-resourced as we are 
and are likely to remain, it makes 
sense to redouble those initiatives 
that appear to hit a nerve centre in 
the forces used against us. 
This article was prepared as a discus- 
sionpaperfora workshop at the confer- 
ence "Tranforming Women i Future: 
Equality Rights in the New Century" 
organized by West Coast  LEAF^^^ held 
November 4-7, I999 in Vancouver. 
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'Police classify only about 3 per cent 
of sexual assaults as Level 11 assaults 
(sexual assaultwith aweapon or caus- 
ing bodily harm) and one per cent as 
Level 111 (aggravated sexual assault 
causing wounds, maiming or disfig- 
urement or endangering life), thereby 
ignoring significant degrees of vio- 
lence or the use of a weapon in many 
cases. Sentencing judges tend not to 
articulate their sentencing principles 
and follow no consistent principles 
or practices. In the result, sentencing 
leaves ample room for subjective bias, 
including bias rooted in rape my- 
thology. See Mohr. 
ZThe guidelines authored by the 
Seaboyer majority only covered con- 
sensual sex. Bill C-49 explicitly re- 
jected the language of the majority 
pidelines to cover all sexual history. 
jIt should be underlined that federal, 
provincial and territorial justice min- 
isters concurred that, unless Parlia- 
ment were willing to exercise its con- 
stitutional power to over-ride Char- 
ter guarantees, it was powerless to 
undo the damaging effects of the 
Seaboyer decision. A remarkable coa- 
lition of feminists legal activists con- 
ceived and successfully persuaded 
Department of Justice lawyers to 
adopt a constitutionally defensible 
and equality-driven response to 
Seaboyer. See McIntyre. 
*In the sub-section enumerating the 
statutory and constitutional provi- 
sions "relevant" to  the case, 
McLachlin J. did not even list S. 15. 
Reference to S. 15 appears as an "in- 
terest" subsumed under s. 7, and as a 
passing phrase in the lengthy S. 1 
analysis (at pp. 257 and 275 in DLR 
version). 
5This agency remains gendered, how- 
ever, modelled as it is on a paradigm 
where he asks and she chooses. 
6R. V. M.L.M., [l9941 2 SCR 3. 
Consent was not in issue at trial. 
Because the complainant had re- 
canted under parental pressure, the 
defence was that no sexual contact of 
any kind had occurred. The trial 
judge accepted the testimony of the 
complainant and convicted. The ac- 
cused appealed the judge's admis- 
sion of inculpatory hadwritten notes. 
O n  its own motion the Nova Scotia 
Court ofAppeal reversed on the ba- 
sis that the complainant had not 
actively resisted her step-father with 
the result that the Crown had not 
proved beyond a doubt that the had 
not consented. 
7The accused's counsel may put the 
mistake defence to the finder of fact 
whether or not the accused testifies. 
An accused who knew the sex was 
non-consensual can secure an ac- 
quittal based on the mistake defence 
without even perjuring himself: his 
lawyer need use the examination and 
cross-examination ofother witnesses 
to seed in the imagination of the 
judge or individual jury members 
hypothetical possibilities capable of 
supporting the plausibility that some 
men, including the accused, might 
have believed sex consensual under 
the hypothetical scenerio(s) offered. 
'See Elizabeth Sheehy's article in this 
volume. 
'It should be noted that no such 
public furore followed McClung's 
homophobic and anti-minority ti- 
rade in the Vriend decision (1996), 
132 DLR (41~) 595 (Alta. C.A.). Nor 
did any Supreme Court justice cen- 
sure his comments despite a specific 
request that they do so from the 
Association of Canadian Human 
Rights Commissions. 
10"Proposed sex assault Bill an ex- 
pression of feminist hatred," The 
Lawyers Weekly 3 1 January 1992: 9: 
"What is really insidious about the 
'every-heterosexual-act-is-a-rape 
nonsense is its denial of both the 
autonomy and the sexuality of 
women." 
"The public sponsor of this tactic 
was lawyer Michael Edelson. See 
Schmitz. Marilyn MacCrimmon has 
argued that this new defence tactic 
reintroduces the medieval "trial by 
ordeal." 
I2The majority stated that therapy 
records may be relevant to reveal the 
use oftherapy "which influenced the 
complainant's memory" and where 
there is a "close temporal connec- 
tion" between the records' creation 
and the decision to press charges or 
where the decision to press charges 
followed avisit to "a particular thera- 
pist." 
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